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1 Introduction
People are often baffled by my theory of con-
sciousness, which seems to them to be summed
up  neatly  in  the  paradoxical  claim  that  con-
sciousness  is  an  illusion.  How could  that  be?
Whose  illusion?  And  would  it  not  be  a  con-
scious illusion? What a hopeless view! In a bet-
ter world, the principle of charity would set in
and  they  would  realise  that  I  probably  had
something rather less daft in mind, but life is
short, and we’ll have one less difficult and coun-
terintuitive theory to worry about if we just dis-
miss Dennett’s as the swiftly self-refuting claim
that consciousness is  an illusion. Other theor-
ists,  including,  notably,  Nicholas Humphrey
(2006,  2011),  Thomas Metzinger (2003,  2009)
and  Jesse Prinz (2012), know better, and offer
theories  that  share  important  features  with
mine. I toyed with the idea of trying to re-offer
my theory in terms that would signal the areas
of agreement and disagreement with these wel-
come allies, but again, life is short, and I have
found that task simply too much hard work. So
with apologies, I’m going to restate my position
with a few new—or at least newly emphasized
—wrinkles, and let them tell us where we agree
and disagree. 
I take one of the usefully wrong landmarks
in current  thinking about consciousness  to be
Ned  Block’s  attempt  to  distinguish  “phenom-
enal consciousness” from “access consciousness.”
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His view has several problems that I have poin-
ted out before (Dennett 1994,  1995,  2005;  Co-
hen &  Dennett 2011), but my criticisms have
not been sufficiently persuasive, so I am going
to attempt, yet again, to show why we should
abandon this distinction as scientifically insup-
portable  and  deeply  misleading.  My  attempt
should at least help put my alternative view in
a better light, where it can be assayed against
the views of Block and others. Here is the out-
line, couched in terms that will have to be clari-
fied and adjusted as we go along:
1. There is no double transduction in the brain.
(section 1)
Therefore  there  is  no  second  medium,  the
medium of consciousness or, as I like to call
this  imaginary phenomenon,  the  MEdium.  
Therefore,  qualia,  conceived  of  as  states  of
this imaginary medium, do not exist. 
2. But it seems to us that they do. (section 2)
It seems that qualia are the source or cause
of our judgments about phenomenal proper-
ties  (“access  consciousness”),  but  this  is
backwards. If they existed, they would have
to be the effects of those judgments. 
3. The seeming alluded to in proposition 2 is to
be explained in terms of  Bayesian expecta-
tions. (section 3)
4. Why do  qualia  seem simple  and  ineffable?
This is an effect, a byproduct, an artifact of
“access consciousness.” (section 4)
5. Whose access? Not a witness in the Cartesian
Theater (because there is no such functional
place). (section 5)
The access  of  other  people!  Our  “first-per-
son” subjectivity is shaped by the pressure of
“second-persons”—interlocutors—to  have
practical access to what is  going on in our
minds. 
6. A thought experiment shows how even color
qualia can be understood as Bayesian projec-
tions. 
2 There is no double transduction in the 
brain
The arrival of photons on the retina is trans-
duced  thanks  to  rhodopsin  in  the  rods  and
cones,  to yield spike trains in the optic nerve
(I’m simplifying, of course). The arrival of pres-
sure waves at the hair cells in the ear are simil-
arly transduced into spike trains in the auditory
nerve, heat and pressure are transduced into yet
more  spike  trains  by  subcutaneous  receptors,
and the presence of  complex molecules in the
air we breathe into our noses is transduced by a
host  of  different  transducer  molecules  in  the
nasal epithelium. The common medium of spike
trains in neuronal axons is well understood, but
used to be regarded as a baffling puzzle: how
could spike  trains  that  were  so  alike  in  their
physical properties and patterning underlie such
“phenomenally”  different  phenomena  as  sight,
hearing, touch, and smell? (see  Dennett 1978,
for  an exposure  of  the  puzzle.)  It  is  still  ex-
tremely tempting to imagine that vision is like
television, and that those spike trains get trans-
duced “back into subjective  color  and sound”
and so forth, but we know better, don’t we? We
don’t have to strike up the little band in the
brain to play the music we hear in our minds,
and we don’t  have to waft molecules  through
the cortex to be the grounds for our savoring
the aroma of bacon or strawberries. There is no
second transduction.  And if  there were,  there
would  have  to  be  a  third  transduction,  back
into spike trains, to account for our ability to
judge and act on the basis of our subjective ex-
periences.  There  might  have  been  such  triple
transductions, and then there would have been
a Cartesian Theater Deluxe, like the wonderful
control room in the film Men in Black. But bio-
logy has been thrifty in us: it’s all done through
the medium of spike trains in neurons. (I recog-
nize  that  dualists  of  various  stripes—a  genus
thought  extinct  not  so  many  years  ago—will
want to dig in their heels right here. I will ig-
nore  their  howls  for  the  time being,  thinking
that I can dispatch them later in the argument
when I provide an answer to their implied ques-
tion “What else could it be?”) 
So there is no  MEdium into which spike
trains are transduced. Spike trains are discrim-
inated, elaborated, processed, reverberated, re-
entered, combined, compared, and contrasted—
but  not  transduced  into  anything  else  until
some of them activate effectors (neuromuscular
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junctions,  hormone  releasers,  and  the  like)
which do the physical work of guiding the body
through  life.  The  rich  and  complex  interplay
between neurons, hundreds of neuromodulators,
and hormones is now recognized, thanks to the
persuasive work of Damasio and many others,
as a central feature of cognition and not just
bodily control, and one can speak of these inter-
actions as transduction back and forth between
different  media  (voltage  differences  and  bio-
chemical  accumulations,  for  instance)—but
none of these is the imagined  MEdium of sub-
jective experience. 
So there just is no home in the brain for
qualia as traditionally conceived. My point can
be clarified by a simple comparison between two
well-understood media: cinema film and digital
media.  First  imagine  showing  some  stone-age
hunter-gatherers a movie using a portable Su-
per-8  film  projector.  Amazing,  they  would
think,  but  when  they  were  then  shown  the
frames of film up close, they would readily un-
derstand—I daresay—that this was not magic,
because there were little blobs of color on each
frame. (The soundtrack might still be baffling,
but  perhaps  they  would  hold  the  film  up  to
their  ears  and  decide,  eventually,  that  the
sounds were just too faint for them to hear with
their naked ears.) Then show them a film on a
portable  DVD  player,  and  demonstrate  the
powers of the removable, interchangeable disks,
and let them ponder the question of how such a
disk managed to store all the sounds and colors
they just observed on the screen. It would prob-
ably  be  tempting for  them to declare that  it
must be magic—dualism, in other words. But
with a little instruction,  they could no doubt
catch on to the idea that you don’t have to rep-
resent color with color, sound with sound. You
can  transduce color,  sound—anything, really—
into a system of patterns of differences (0s and
1s, spike trains, …) and then transduce the ele-
ments of that system back into color and sound
with playback equipment. This could lay magic
to rest.
I had better make my implicit claim expli-
cit, at the risk of insulting some readers: if you
think there has to be a medium in the brain (or
in a dualistic mind) in which subjective colors,
sounds, and aromas are rendered, you are mak-
ing the stone-ager mistake. This, I have come to
believe,  is  the  stone  wall  separating  my view
from wider acceptance. People pay attention to
my arguments,  and then, confronted with the
prospect that qualia, as traditionally conceived,
are  not  needed  to  explain  their  subjectivity,
they just dismiss the idea as extravagant. “OF
COURSE there  are qualia!”  This  thought ex-
periment is meant to shock them: your confid-
ence here, I am saying, is no better grounded
than the imagined confidence of the stone-agers
that there just have to be colors and sounds on
the DVD for it to convey colors and sounds to
the playback machine. A failure of imagination
mistaken  for  an  insight  into  necessity.  “But
when I have a tune running through my head, it
has pitch and tempo, and the timbre of the in-
struments is there just as if I were listening to a
live performance!” Yes, and for that to be non-
magically the case, there has to be a representa-
tion of the tune that progresses more or less in
real time, and that specifies pitch and timbre,
but that can all be accomplished without trans-
duction,  without further  rendering,  in  the  se-
quence of states of neural excitation in auditory
cortex. 
Vision isn’t  television, and audition isn’t
radio.  We  are  accustomed,  now,  to  playback
devices that do transduce the signals back into
the  colors  and  sounds  from which  they  were
transduced, but we need to take advantage of
our twenty-first  century sophistication and re-
cognize  that  the  second  transduction  is  op-
tional! The information is in the signal, and all
that  information  can  be  processed,  discrimin-
ated,  translated,  re-coded,  simplified,  embel-
lished, categorized, tagged, adjusted, and used
to  guide  behavior  without  ever  being  trans-
duced back into colors and sounds (or “subject-
ive” colors and sounds). 
3 It still seems that qualia exist
But it sure seems that qualia exist, in spite of
the foregoing! How could they not? Aren’t they
needed, for instance, to be the source or cause
of our judgments about them? If I have a con-
viction that I’m seeing an American flag after-
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image (see  figure 1), and note that the lowest
short  red  stripe  intersects  the  central  cross,
doesn’t there have to be the red stripe I deem
myself to be experiencing? Isn’t the presence of
that red stripe somewhere a necessary condition
for me seeming to see a red stripe? No, and the
alternative has been at least dimly understood
since Hume’s brilliant discussion of our experi-
ence of causation. 
Figure 1: Inverted American Flag.
Consider what I will call Hume’s Strange
Inversion (cf.  Dennett 2009). We think we see
causation  because  the  causation  in  the  world
directly  causes  us  to  see  it—the  same  way
round things in daylight cause us to see round
things, and tigers in moonlight cause us to see
tigers. When we see the thrown ball causing the
window to break, the causation itself is some-
how perceptible “out there.” Not so, says Hume
(1739, section 7 “Of the idea of necessary con-
nexion”). What causes us to have the idea of
causation is not something external but some-
thing internal. We have seen many instances of
As followed by Bs, Hume asserts, and by a pro-
cess of roughly Pavlovian conditioning (to put it
anachronistically) we have been caused by this
series of experiences to have in our minds a dis-
position,  when seeing  an  A,  to  expect  a  B—
even before the B shows up. When it does, this
felt disposition to expect a B is mis-identified as
an  external,  seen property  of  causation.  We
think we experience causation between A and
B,  when we are actually  experiencing  our in-
ternal judgment “here comes a B” and “project-
ing” it into the world. This is a special case of
the mind’s “great propensity to spread itself on
external objects” (Hume 1739, I, xiv). In fact,
Hume insisted, what we do is misinterpret an
inner “feeling”—an anticipation—as an external
property.  The  “customary  transition”  in  our
minds is the source of our sense of causation, a
quality of “perceptions, not of objects,” but we
mis-attribute it to the objects, a sort of benign
user-illusion,  to  speak  anachronistically  again.
As Hume notes, “the contrary notion is so riv-
eted in the mind” that it is hard to dislodge. It
survives to this day in the typically unexamined
assumption that all  perceptual  representations
must be flowing inbound from outside. 
Hume wrote that  the  ‘mind has a great
propensity to spread itself on external ob-
jects’ (T 1.3.14.25; SBN 167) and that we
‘gild and stain’ natural objects ‘with the
colours borrowed from internal sentiment’
(EPM Appendix  1.19;  SBN 294).  These
metaphors have invited a further one: that
of  ‘projection’  and  its  cognates.  Though
not Hume’s own, the projection metaphor
is now so closely associated with him, both
in exegetical and non-exegetical contexts,
that  the  phrase  ‘Humean  projection’  is
something of a cliché in philosophical dis-
course. (Kail 2007, p. 20) 
Here are a few other folk convictions that need
Strange  Inversions:  sweetness  is  an  “intrinsic”
property of sugar and honey, which causes us to
like  them;  observed  intrinsic  sexiness  is  what
causes our lust; it was the funniness out there in
the joke that caused us to laugh (Hurley et al.
2011). There is no more familiar and appealing
verb than “project” to describe this effect, but
of course everybody knows it is only metaphor-
ical; colors aren’t literally projected (as if from
a slide projector) out onto the front surfaces of
(colorless) objects,  any more than the idea of
causation  is  somehow  beamed  out  onto  the
point of impact between the billiard balls. If we
use the shorthand term “projection” here to try
to  talk,  metaphorically,  about  the  mismatch
between manifest  and scientific  image (Sellars
1962), what is the true long story? What is lit-
erally going on in the scientific image? A large
part of the answer emerges, I propose, from the
predictive coding perspective.  Every organism,
whether  a  bacterium  or  a  member  of  Homo
sapiens,  has a set of things in the world that
matter to it and which it (therefore) needs to
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discriminate and anticipate as best it can. Call
this the ontology of the organism, or the organ-
ism’s “Umwelt” (von Uexküll 1957). This does
not yet have anything to do with consciousness
but is rather an “engineering” concept, like the
ontology of a bank of elevators in a skyscraper:
all the kinds of things and situations the elevat-
ors need to distinguish and deal with. An an-
imal’s “Umwelt” consists in the first place of af-
fordances (Gibson 1979), things to eat or mate
with, openings to walk through or look out of,
holes  to  hide  in,  things  to  stand  on,  and  so
forth. We may suppose that the “Umwelt” of a
starfish or worm or daisy is more like the onto-
logy of the elevator than like our manifest im-
age.  What’s  the  difference?  What  makes  our
manifest image manifest (to us)? 
4 Bayesian expectations
Here is where Bayesian expectations (see Clark
2013) could play an iterated role: our ontology
(in the elevator sense) does a close-to-optimal
job of representing the things in the world that
matter to the behavior our brains have to con-
trol (cf. Metzinger 2003, on our world models).
Hierarchical  Bayesian  predictions  accomplish
this,  generating  affordances  galore:  we  expect
solid objects to have backs that will come into
view as we walk around them, doors to open,
stairs  to  afford climbing,  cups to hold liquid,
etc. But among the things in our Umwelt that
matter to our wellbeing are ourselves! We ought
to have good Bayesian expectations about what
we will do next, what we will think next, and
what we will expect next! And we do. Here’s an
example:
Think of the cuteness of babies. It is not,
of  course,  an  “intrinsic”  property  of  babies,
though it seems to be. What you “project” out
onto the baby is in fact your manifold of “felt”
dispositions  to  cuddle,  protect,  nurture,  kiss,
coo  over,  … that  little  cutie-pie.  It’s  not  just
that when your cuteness detector (based on fa-
cial proportions, etc.) fires, you have urges to
nurture and protect; you expect to have those
very urges,  and that manifold of  expectations
just  is  the “projection”  onto  the  baby of  the
property of cuteness. When we expect to see a
baby  in  the  crib,  we  also  expect  to  “find  it
cute”—that is, we expect to expect to feel the
urge to cuddle it and so forth. When our ex-
pectations are fulfilled,  the absence of  predic-
tion error signals is interpreted as confirmation
that, indeed, the thing in the world with which
we are interacting has the properties we expec-
ted it  to  have.  Without the iterated expecta-
tions, cuteness could do its work “subliminally,”
outside our notice; it could be part of our “elev-
ator ontology” (the ontology that theorists need
to posit to account for our various dispositions
and talents) but not part of  our  ontology, the
things and properties we can ostend, reflect on,
report,  discuss,  or  appeal  to  when  explaining
our own behavior (to ourselves or others). Cute-
ness as a property passes the Bayesian test for
being an objective structural part of the world
we live in (our  manifest  manifest image), and
that is all that needs to happen.  Any further
“projection” process would be redundant. What
it is to experience a baby as cute is to generate
the series of expectations and confirmations just
described. What is special about properties like
sweetness and cuteness is that their perception
depends on particularities  of  the nervous sys-
tems that have evolved to make much of them.
The same is of course also true of colors. This is
what is left of Locke’s (and Boyle’s) distinction
between primary and secondary qualities.1
Similarly, when we feel the urge to judge
something  about  “that  red  stripe”  (in  the
American  flag  afterimage  (see  Figure  1)  that
hovers in our visual field, we have the tempta-
tion to insist that there is a red stripe—there
has to be!—causing us to seem to see it. But
however natural and human this temptation is,
it must be resisted. We can be caused to seem
to see something by something that shares no
features  with  the  illusory  object.  (Remember
Ebenezer  Scrooge  saying  to  Marley’s  ghost:
“You may be an undigested bit of beef, a blot of
mustard, a crumb of cheese, a fragment of an
underdone potato. There’s more of gravy than
of grave about you, whatever you are!” Many
would insist that there has to be a ghost-shaped
intermediary in the causal chain between blot of
1 The material in the previous five paragraphs is adapted from Den-
nett (2013).
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mustard  and  belief  in  Marley,  but  Scrooge
might be right in addressing his remark to the
cause of his current condition, and be leaving
nothing  Marley-shaped  out.)  And  as  for  the
idea that without being rendered such contents
are causally impotent, it is simply mistaken, as
a thought experiment will  reveal.  Suppose we
have  a  drone  aircraft  hunting  for  targets  to
shoot  at,  and  suppose  that  the  drone  is
equipped with a safety device that is constantly
on the lookout for red crosses on buildings or
vehicles—we don’t  want it  shooting at  ambu-
lances or field hospitals! With its video eye it
takes  in  and  transduces  (into  digital  bit
streams) thirty frames a second (let’s suppose)
and scans each frame for a red cross  (among
other things). Does it have to project the frame
onto  a  screen,  transducing  bit  streams  into
colored pixels? Of course not. It can make judg-
ments based on un-transduced information—in
fact, it can’t make judgments based on anything
else. Similarly your brain can make judgments
to the effect that there is a red stripe out there
on the basis of spike train patterns in your cor-
tex, and then act on that judgment (by causing
the  subject  to  declare  “I  seem  to  see  a  red
stripe,” or by adjusting an internal inventory of
things in the neighborhood, or …). (I am delib-
erately  using  the  word  “judgment”  for  the
drone’s discriminations and the brain’s discrim-
inations; I have elsewhere called such items mi-
cro-takings or content-fixations. The main point
of using “judgment” is to drive home the claim
that these events are  not anything like the ex-
emplification  of  properties,  intrinsic  or  other-
wise.  They  are  not  qualia,  in  other  words.
Qualia—as typically conceived—would only get
in  the  way.  Don’t  put  a  weighty  LED  pixel
screen in a drone if you want it to detect red
crosses, and don’t bother installing qualia in a
brain  if  you  want  it  to  have  color  vision.
Whatever they are, qualia are unnecessary and
may be jettisoned without loss.) 
So the familiar idea (familiar in the con-
text of Block’s proposed distinction between ac-
cess  consciousness  and  phenomenal  conscious-
ness) that phenomenal consciousness (= qualia)
is  the basis  for  access  consciousness  (= judg-
ments  about  qualia,  qualia-guided  decisions,
etc.)  is  backwards.2 Once  the  discerning  has
happened  in  the  untransduced  world  of  spike
trains, it can yield a sort of Humean projection
—of a red stripe or red cross or just red, for in-
stance—into “subjective space.” 
But what is this subjective space in which
the projection happens? Nothing. It is a theor-
ist’s  fiction.  The  phenomenon  of  “color  phi”
nicely illustrates  the point.  When shown, say,
two disks displaced somewhat from each other,
one sees the apparent motion of a single disk—
the phi phenomenon that is the basis of anima-
tion  (and  motion  pictures  in  general).  If  the
disks are of  different colors—the left  disk red
and the right disk green, for instance—one will
see the red disk moving rightward and changing
its color to green in mid-trajectory. How did the
brain “know” to move the disk rightward and
switch colors before having access to the green
disk at its location? It couldn’t (supposing pre-
cognition to be ruled out).  But it could have
Bayesian  expectations  of  continuous  motion
from place to place that provoke a (retrospect-
ive)  expectation  of  the  intermediate  content,
and this expectation encounters no disconfirma-
tion (if the timing is right), which suffices to es-
tablish in  reality  the illusory sequence  in  the
subject’s manifest image. So the visual system’s
access to the information about the green disk
is  causally  prior  to  the  “phenomenal”  motion
and color change. Here is a diagram of color phi
2 I once had an occasion to point out this prospect to Block. He had
just participated in a laterality test, to see how strongly lateralized
for language his brain was. There are two oft-used ways of testing
this: with dichotic headphones, which send different words into each
ear, where the subject is asked to identify the word heard (typically
you only hear one of them!). A second, visual test involves looking at
a center target on a screen and having a word or non-word (e.g.,
“flum” or “janglet”) flashed briefly in either the left or right visual
field. The subject presses the word button or the non-word button
and latencies and errors are recorded. If you are strongly lateralized
left (your left hemisphere is strongly dominant for language and does
most of the work of language processing), you are faster and more
accurate on words and nonwords flashed to the right hemifield. Ned
had taken the visual test, and I asked him what he had learned. He
was, he said, strongly lateralized left for language, like most people,
and he added “the words flashed on the left actually seemed blurry!”
I asked him whether the words seemed blurry because he noted the
difficulty he was having with them, or whether he had the difficulty
because the words were blurry. He acknowledged that he had no in-
trospective way of distinguishing these  two hypotheses. Supposing
that Block doesn’t have some remarkable problem with his eyes, in
which the left half of each lens is occluded or misshapen, producing a
blur on the left side of his retinas, it is highly likely that the blurri-
ness he seemed to experience was an effect of his felt difficulty in re -
sponding, not the cause of this difficulty.
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from  Consciousness Explained (and  Dennett &
Kinsbourne 1992): 
Figure  2:  Superimposition  of  subjective  and objective
sequences.
In order to explain “temporal anomalies”
of conscious experience, we need to appreciate
that not only do we not have to represent red
with something red, and round with something
round;  we  don’t  have  to  represent  time  with
time. Recall my example “Tom arrived at the
party after Bill did.” When you hear the sen-
tence  you  learn  of  Tom’s  arrival  before  you
learn of Bill’s, but what you learn is that Bill
arrived  earlier.  No  revolution  in  physics  or
metaphysics is needed to account for this simple
distinction between the temporal properties of a
representation and the temporal properties rep-
resented thereby. It  is  quite possible (in color
phi,  for instance) for the brain to discern (in
objective time) first one red circle (cat time 3)
and then a green circle (fat time 5) displaced to
the right, and then to (mis-)represent an inter-
mediate  red-turning-green  circle  (eat  time  8)
yielding  the  subjective  judgment  of  apparent
motion  with  temporally  intermediate  color
change. Here our Bayesian probabilistic anticip-
ator is caught in the act, jumping to the most
likely conclusion in the absence of any evidence.
Experienced or subjective time doesn’t line up
with objective time, and it doesn’t have to. The
important point to remember from the diagram
is that the subjective time sequence is NOT like
a bit  of  kinked film that then has to be run
through a projector somewhere so that c is fol-
lowed by e is followed by f in real time. It is just
a theorist’s diagram of how subjective time can
relate to objective time. Subjective time is not a
further real component of the causal picture. No
rendering is necessary, the judgment is already
in, and doesn’t have to be re-presented for an-
other act of judging (in the Cartesian Theater). 
The  temptation  to  think  otherwise  may
run deep, but it is fairly readily exposed. Con-
sider fiction. Sherlock Holmes and Watson seem
real when one is reading a Conan Doyle mystery
—as real as Disraeli or Churchill in a biography.
When Sherlock seems real, does this require him
and his world to be rendered somewhere, in—
let’s call it—fictoplasm?  No. There is no need
for a medium of fictoplasm to render fiction ef-
fective, and there is no need for a mysterious
medium, material or immaterial, to render sub-
jective  experience  effective.  No  doubt  the
temptation to posit the existence of fictoplasm
derives from our human habit, when reading, of
adding  details  in  imagination  that  aren’t
strictly in the book. Then, for instance, when
we see  a  film of  the novel,  we can truly  say
“That’s not how I imagined Holmes when I read
the book.” 
Isn’t such rendering in imagination while
reading a novel a case of  transduction of con-
tent from one medium (written words as seen
on the page) into another (imagined events as
seen  and heard in  the  mind’s  eye  and ear)?
No, this is not transduction; it is, more prop-
erly,  a  variety  of  translation,  effortlessly  ex-
panding  the  content  thanks  to  the  built-in
Bayesian  prediction  mechanisms.  We  could
construct,  for  instance,  a  digital  device  that
takes problems in plane geometry presented in
writing  (“From  Euclidean  axioms  prove  the
Pythagorean  Theorem.”)  and  solves  them
through a process that involves making Euc-
lidean  constructions,  with  all  the  sides  and
angles  properly represented and labeled,  and
utilizing them in the proof. The whole process
from receipt of the problem to delivery of the
called-for  proof  (complete  with  printed-out
diagrams if you like), is conducted in a single
medium of digital bit strings, with no trans-
duction until  the printer  or screen is  turned
on to render the answer. (A more detailed de-
scription of this kind of transformative process
without  transduction  is  found in  my discus-
sion (1991) of how the robot Shakey discrim-
inated boxes from pyramids.)
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Consider  Figure  2 above.  Does  the
access/phenomenal consciousness distinction get
depicted  therein?  If  so,  access  consciousness
should be identified with the objective time line,
and phenomenal consciousness (if it were some-
thing real in addition to access consciousness)
would be depicted in the line that doubles back
in time.  The content  feature that  creates  the
kink is an effect of a judgment or discernment
that came later in objective time than the dis-
cernment of the green circle at time 5. It is be-
cause the brain already had access to red circle,
then green circle that it generated a representa-
tion  (but  not  a  rendering)  of  the  in-between
red-turning-green circle as an elaborative effect.3
5 Why do qualia seem so simple and 
ineffable? 
Qualia seem atomic to introspection, unanalyz-
able simples—the smell of violets, the shade of
blue, the sound of an oboe—but this is clearly
an effect of something like the resolution of our
discernment machinery. 
If our vision were as poorly spatially re-
solved as our olfaction, when a bird flew by, the
sky would suddenly “go all birdish,”—that pe-
culiar, indescribable birdishness that one would
experience in the visual presence of birds. And
this resolution is variable: music lovers and wine
enthusiasts  and others  can  train up their  ear
and their palate and come to distinguish, intro-
spectively, the combining elements of what used
to seem atomic and unanalyzable. David Huron
(2006), has done some ingenious work teasing
out and explaining the combinations of neuroar-
chitectonic properties that explain the otherwise
ineffable characteristic qualia of scale tones (the
way do sounds different from re and mi and so).
It  turns  out  that  these  “qualia”  are  actually
highly structured properties of neural represent-
ations. The explanation, needless to say, is ulti-
mately in the medium of spike trains. 
But why should the resolution (if that is
the  right  term)  be  so  low?  Why  should  our
brains ignore so much detail in the representa-
tions  to  which  “we”  have  “access”?  Minsky
3 Thanks to David Gottlieb for drawing my attention to this way of
looking at access consciousness. 
(1985),  Dennett  (1991),  Norretranders (1999),
Metzinger (2003), and others have said that it is
the brain’s own access to its own complex in-
ternal activities that accounts for the simplicity.
This is the brain’s effective user-illusion for it-
self, in much the way the desktop with its icons
and  various  metaphors  (click  and  drag,  high-
lighted  targets,  etc.)  is  an  elegantly  designed
user-illusion  for  laypeople  who  don’t  need  to
know how their computers work. 
The brain does not have a single internal
witness or homunculus, but it does need some-
thing like a lingua franca to get the different
and semi-independent subsystems to communic-
ate with each other. (For instance, in the Global
Neuronal Workplace model4 of  Dehaene et al.
(2006), and others, one should not take it for
granted that the  local meanings of spike train
patterns—in  the  dorsal  vision  stream,  say,  or
the olfactory bulb—are readily “understood” by
all the elements to which some of these signals
are  broadcast.)  I  think  there  is  bound  to  be
some important truth in that theme, but it is
only part of the story. 
6 Whose access?
I think the more interesting suggestion is that
the  effective  “we”  when  we  talk  about  what
“we” have access to, is, indeed, we—not just I,
but  you and me.  It is, more particularly,  your
access to  my mind that simplifies the informa-
tion that we have access to! 
The linguist  Stephen Levinson (2006) has
studied the remarkable language, Yélî  Dnye, of
the three thousand or so inhabitants of Rossel Is-
land in the South Pacific—to the north of Papua
New Guinea. It is a completely isolated language,
unlike any other in the world in many regards. In
particular, it is hideously complex, with: 
the largest phoneme inventory (ninety dis-
tinct segments) in the Pacific, and many
4 Isn’t the Global Neuronal Workplace the derided Cartesian Theater
after all? No, because what goes on there is not transduction-and-
rendering, but informational integration: the coalition and consilience
of competing elements. There is no transduction threshold that de-
termines the time-of-entry “into consciousness”, and none of the mul-
tiple drafts competing in it are singled out as being conscious except
retrospectively. This is the point of my admonition always to ask the
Hard Question: “And then what happens?” (Dennett 1991, p. 225) 
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sounds (such as doubly articulated labial
coronal  stops)  that  are  either  unique  or
rare in the languages of the world. Among
the fifty-six consonants are many multiply
articulated  segments:  e.g.,  /ţpņm/  is  a
single  segment  made  by  simultaneously
putting  the  tongue  behind  the  alveolar
ridge,  trilling the lips  ,  and snorting air
through the nose. […] Once the learner is
past the sound hurdle, he or she faces an-
other  formidable  obstacle.  The  language
has an extremely complex system of verb
inflection  (with  thousands  of  distinct  in-
flectional  forms).  […]  In  addition,  substi-
tute forms are used where the subject has
been mentioned before, is close or visible,
is  in  motion,  or  where  the  sentence  is
counterfactual or negative, thus providing
well over a thousand possibilities […]. (Lev-
inson 2006, p. 20) 
Levinson reports, not surprisingly, that “[h]ar-
dly any mature individuals (such as non-nat-
ive spouses) who have immigrated into the is-
land community ever learn to speak the lan-
guage,  and children  of  expatriate  Rossels  do
not fully acquire it from their parents alone.”
His explanation is speculative, but plausible: a
language, left to itself for centuries, will grow
ever  more  complex,  like  an  unpruned  bush,
simply because it can. The extreme isolation
of Rossel Island over the centuries (for various
geographic reasons) means that the language
has hardly ever been confronted with non-nat-
ive speakers  of  another  language with whom
communication  is  imperative,  for  one  reason
or another. The need for communication soon
generates a small cadre of bi-lingual interpret-
ers, and maybe also a pidgin (and maybe later
a creole), and all of these alien interfaces work
to  simplify  a  language.  The  least  learnable,
most  baroque (in  the sense of  exceeding the
functional)  features  of  the  language  are
dropped  under  this  pressure.  We  can  see  it
happening with English today, with simplified
dialects  such  as  Emblish  (as  spoken  at  the
European  Molecular  Biology  Laboratory  in
Heidelberg)  arising  naturally  and  impercept-
ibly. 
I would like to speculate that a similar pro-
cess  of  gradual but incessant simplification has
shaped the language we have available to explain
and describe our minds to each other. Wittgen-
stein’s famous claim about the impossibility of a
private language has not weathered the storms of
controversy particularly well, but there are neigh-
boring  claims—empirical  claims—that  deserve
consideration.  Many  years  ago,  Nicholas
Humphrey (1987) made the point that has begun
to attract adherents today:
While it is of no interest to a person to
have the same kind of kidney as another
person, it is of interest to him to have the
same kind of mind: otherwise as a natural
psychologist  he’d  be  in  trouble.  Kidney
transplants  occur  very  rarely  in  nature,
but something very much like mind-trans-
plants occur all the time […]. [So] we can
assume that throughout a long history of
evolution all sorts of different ways of de-
scribing the brain’s activity have been ex-
perimented  with  but  only  those  most
suited to doing psychology have been pre-
served. Thus the particular picture of our
inner selves that human beings do in fact
now have—the  picture  we  know as  ‘us’,
and cannot imagine being of any different
kind—is  neither  a  necessary  description
nor is it any old description of the brain: it
is the one that has proved most suited to
our needs as social beings. That is why it
works.  Not  only  can  we  count  on  other
people’s brains being very much like ours,
we can count on the picture we each have
of  what  it’s  like  to  have  a  brain  being
tailor-made to explain the way that other
people actually behave. Consciousness is a
socio-biological product—in the best sense
of socio and biological. (p. 18)
Chris Frith, for instance, has recently taken up
the theme (in conversation) that consciousness
has some features,  because everything in con-
sciousness has to be couched in terms that can
be communicated to other people readily. 
The ineffability barrier  we all  experience
when trying to tell others what it is like to be
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us on particular occasions is highly variable, not
just between individuals, but over time within a
single  individual,  as  a  result  of  formal  or  in-
formal training. It plays a dynamic role in shap-
ing the contents of our consciousness over time.5
(This would be true only for human conscious-
ness, obviously.) 
7 A thought experiment: Mr. Capgras
Finally, it might seem that whereas some sub-
jective properties—cute, sweet, funny, sexy, the
characteristic  sounds of  scale  tones—might be
accounted for in terms of Bayesian expectations
about how one will  be disposed to behave in
their  presence,  the  very  simplicity  of  colors
must block any attempt to treat them in a sim-
ilar fashion. There is no way one expects to be-
have in the presence of navy blue, or pale yel-
low, or lime green. So it may seem, but this is
itself an artifact of our penchant for thinking—
as  Hume  famously  did—of  colors  as  simples.
Hume  was  discountenanced  by  the  notorious
missing shade of blue, and found it ideologically
inconvenient to suppose, as we now know, that
color experience is in fact highly complex and
compositional, and deeply anchored in disposi-
tions  of  our  perceptual  systems.6 Moreover,
color experiences are no more atomic than scale
tone experiences, and give rise to all manner of
expectations, which tend to go unnoticed, but
can be thrown into sharp focus by a thought ex-
periment: my fantasy about poor Mr. Clapgras,
the man who wakes up to find all his emotional
dispositions with regard to colors inverted while
leaving intact his  cognitive habits and powers
(see  Dennett 2005, pp. 91–102, for a more de-
tailed account, with objections considered and
rebutted). Ex hypothesi, Mr. Clapgras identifies
colors  and sorts  colors  correctly  (he does  not
suffer  from  the  well-studied  conditions  color
5 Note  that  I  am  not  saying  that  our  day-to-day  consciousness
wouldn’t occur in the absence of human company, but an implication
of my speculation is that a Robinson Crusoe human, somehow raised
from birth without human contact, would have subjectivity more in-
accessible to us—once we discovered him and attempted to commu-
nicate with him—than the speech acts of the Rossel Islanders.
6 In Cohen & Dennett, we point out that limbic or emotional responses to
colors have to count as instances of “access” to color-representing states
“however coarse-grained or incomplete, because such a reaction can obvi-
ously affect decision making or motivation” (2011, p. 5). 
anomia,  or  cerebral  achromatopsia),  but  he
finds  the  world  disgusting,  unbearable.  Food
looks just terrible to him now, and he has to eat
blindfolded, since his emotional responses to all
colors have shifted 180 degrees around the color
circle (Grush this collection). He calls shocking
pink “shocking pink” but marvels at the inap-
propriateness of its name. The only way we can
explain his distress is by observing that he no-
tices  that  something  is  wrong—which  has  to
mean he was  expecting  something  else.  He is
surprised that breaking a fresh egg into a frying
pan on a sunny morning doesn’t bring a smile
to  his  face,  that  a  glimpse  of  his  obnoxious
neighbor’s lime green convertible doesn’t irritate
him the way it used to do, that he feels no stir-
ring of childhood patriotism when he sees the
red white and blue waving in the breeze. Like
the sufferers of Capgras delusion, poor Mr Clap-
gras  senses  a  disturbance:  something  is  very
wrong, but it isn’t the evaporation of intrinsic
internal properties. 
8 Conclusion
The considerations I have raised in this essay are
not new, but perhaps bringing them together as I
have done will help show that a counter-intuitive
theory like mine still has an advantage over some
of the fantasies  in which philosophers  have re-
cently indulged. It may well be, as  Paul Bloom
(2004)  has  suggested,  that  we are all  “natural
born dualists,” but just as eyeglasses can correct
for myopia, natural-born or not, so science can
correct for this innate cognitive disability. Intu-
itions to the contrary are important  data,  but
should not be taken to indicate a limitation of sci-
ence, as some have thought. In fact, if the best
scientific theory of consciousness turns out not to
be  deeply  counterintuitive  at  first,  among  the
data it will have had to explain is why it took us
so long to arrive at it. 
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